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ABSTRACT
Claim Construction is the first hurdle in patent litigation to invalidate a patent. Traditionally, federal
courts have interpreted claims in their plain and obvious meaning to a person skilled in the art. But
a new avenue through post-grant proceedings at the patent office, such as inter-partes review, has
created a worrying trend of increased patent invalidation. This comment will explore the consequences
of the higher rate of invalidation, proposals suggested to solve the problem, and the actions of those
who exploit it.
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DUELING INTERPRETATIONS: THE CONFLICT ARISING FROM PTAB’S USE
OF BROADEST REASONABLE INTERPRETATION FOR CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
ANDREW G. MARTIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that a company recently won a major suit in the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. The infringing party challenged the validity of the patent, but the
company nonetheless survived the attack. After judgment and damages are
determined, the company receives a peculiar letter in the mail.
The letter
congratulates the company on their victory, but then demands that the company share
10% of the judgment with the sender or the sender will file a proceeding at the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”). How is this possible?
To many this sounds like a clever form of extortion. This activity, however, does
occur,1 is perfectly legal, and only one of the several consequences stemming from the
Federal Circuit’s holding on the ’PTAB’s use of Broadest Reasonable Interpretation
(“BRI”) of patent claims.2
In re Cuozzo is the Federal Circuit case that upheld the PTAB’s use of the broadest
reasonable interpretation standard.3 The holding in this case left many, including the
dissent, questioning what Congress’ true intent was when it enacted the America
Invents Act (“AIA”).4
This comment addresses both the intent behind the creation of inter partes
proceedings and Congress’ intended claim interpretation standard. Part II of this
comment addresses the relevant law, the history and formation of Inter Partes
proceedings, and the problems arising out of In re Cuozzo. Part III of this comment
looks at the congressional intent of the AIA and post-grant proceedings, the purpose
and policy behind the two claim interpretation standards, and the effects on patent
litigation. Finally, Part IV addresses how either Congress or courts can fix this
problem by adopting the BRI standard in all post-grant procedures.
* © Andrew G. Martin 2016. The author is a 3rd year law student at The John Marshall Law
School in Chicago, Illinois. He has focused his studies on intellectual property, specifically patent law.
The author holds a Bachelor of Science in Biochemistry and Molecular Biology with a minor in
Economics from Michigan State University. The author would like to thank his editors, Patrick
Koncel and Daniela Velez, for all of their advice. The author would also to thank his family, Susan
Martin, Gregory Martin, and Benjamin Martin for their constant encouragement. Finally, the author
would like to thank his wonderful wife, Dr. Fariah Ahmad, for without her loving support, none of
this would have been possible.
1 Ex Parte Ferrum Ferro Capital, LLC, No. IPR 2015-00858 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 22, 2015.
2 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 778 F.3d 1271, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that Congress
implicitly adopted the broadest reasonable interpretation standard for the Patent Trial and Appeals
Board with the passage of the America Invents Act.)
3 Id.
4 Id. at 1287-1293 (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that the panel majority’s ruling was contrary
to the AIA. She cites to congressional records that suggest that the IPR system was initiated to
provide “a quick and cost effective alternative to litigation”); see also id.(Prost, C.J., Newman, J.,
Moore, J., O’Malley, J., Reyna, J., dissenting) (stating that because Inter-Partes Review is a new court
like proceeding, the claims should be given their “actual meaning” rather than the broadest meaning).
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II. BACKGROUND
To begin our discussion, we must look at the origin of post-grant proceedings.
Throughout the years, patent reform has been focused on the issue of reducing the
number of “dubious” patents.5 Most of these reforms were based on the theory that
creating additional and more rigorous procedures would improve the “quality” of
patents being issued.6 Eventually, Congress created the first non-judicial postissuance review in 1981.7 This proceeding was called ex parte reexamination (“EPX”)
and essentially allowed the Patent Office to take a “second look” at any issued patent.8
The “second look” allowed the Patent Office to reexamine an issued patent to determine
whether it did in fact meet the requirements of novelty and non-obviousness.9
The EPX procedure was unfortunately not as effective as Congress hoped.
Oftentimes parties abused this procedure by challenging the same patent multiple
times.10 These recurrent challenges created a constant uncertainty of a patent holder’s
rights, even though the vast majority of patents were still confirmed.11
In 1999, Congress decided to reform the EPX procedure by introducing the inter
partes reexamination proceeding (“IPX”).12 Once again, Congress believed that these
changes would result in the improvement of patent quality. 13 EPX and IPX
mechanisms operated in parallel until the AIA was passed. 14
When Congress enacted the AIA, it eliminated the IPX proceeding and replaced it
with Inter-Partes Review (“IPR”) proceeding.15 This new proceeding was created to
offer a quasi-judicial process for reexamination of issued patents. 16 This process was
5 Gregory Dolin M.D., Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C.L. REV 881, 882 (2015); see also Pub. L.
No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (codified in §§ 28 & 35 U.S.C. (2012)); 157 Cong. Rec. S7413 (daily ed. Nov.
14, 2011).
6 Sarah Tran, Policy Tailors and the Patent Office, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 498-99 (2012).
7 See Act of December 12, 1980 (Bayh-Dole Act), Pub. L. No. 96-517, ch. 30, § 302, 94 Stat. 3015,
3015 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012)).
8 Dolin, supra note 5, at 884 (describing the history and effects of the process of ex parte
reexamination).
9 35 U.S.C. § 301
10 Raymond A. Mercado, The Use and Abuse of Patent Reexamination: Sham Petitioning Before
the USPTO, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 93 (2011).
11 Dolin, supra note 5, at 884 citing Robert Harkings, How the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
(AIA) Is Changing Patent Protection and Litigation, ASPATORE (Jan. 2013).
12 American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (codified in
relevant part in 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-318 (2006)) (repealed 2012).
13 Dolin, supra note 5, at 884 (Describing the continual justification for Congress’ attempts at
patent reforms were to improve “patent quality”); Roger Shang, Inter Partes Reexamination and
Improving Patent Quality, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 185, 185 (2009) (“The inter partes
reexamination procedure was created by Congress in 1999 as a means to challenge dubious patents
and to improve patent quality”).
14 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(a), 125 Stat. 284, 299-305
(2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-319 (2012)).
15 Id. at §§ 321-329 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
16 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 778 F.3d at 1287-1293 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. Rep.
No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 46) (stating that the purpose of the Inter Partes review is to “convert inter partes
reexamination from an examination proceeding to an adjudicative proceeding.”); see 157 Cong. Rec.
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created to form an alternative forum where the public could challenge the monopolies
conferred to patent owners without having to resort to proceedings in federal court.17
It was intended to reduce litigation costs, reduce the number of “low quality” patents,
and increase certainty in patent rights. 18 Once again, Congress justified this change
by saying it would help weed out “bad patents.”19 However, Congress has never
appropriately defined what it means by “bad patent.”20 Because IPR is a descendant
from IPX it is important to understand some differences between the two proceedings.
The availability of the IPR proceeding greatly differs from the availability of the
previous IPX proceeding. The majority of granted patents were exempt from the IPX
proceedings due to efforts to reduce the workload at the Patent Office. 21 In light of this
roadblock, Congress expanded the scope of IPRs to allow all issued patents to be
challengeable through IPRs.22
The AIA granted large power to IPR proceedings. An IPR can be filed by any
person and can be used to challenge claims to any issued patent. 23 The earliest an IPR
can be requested is at any point of the patent’s grant period—nine months after the
patent’s issue date.24 However, patents may only be challenged on the basis of lack of
novelty under § 102 and obviousness under § 103.25 An IPR can be issued against any
patent, including ones that were issued prior to the enactment of the AIA. 26 The
request for an IPR will be granted so long as there is a “reasonable likelihood that the
petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the
petition.”27 If the Patent Office decides to order a full trial before the PTAB, it must
be completed within twelve months of the initial petition to the office. 28
An IPR is accompanied by an estoppel provision to prevent petitioners from filing
additional judicial or administrative challenges to the claims that were addressed in
the IPR proceedings. Petitioners will be estopped from any future challenges if based

S111 (Mar. 2, 2011) (Sen. Leahy stating that the purpose of implementing the IPR proceeding is to
“decrease the likelihood of expensive litigation because it creates a less costly, in-house administrative
alternative to review patent validity claims”).
17 See Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the
PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1983 (2013) (noting the repeated references in the AIA’s legislative
history to trial-like proceedings).
18 See H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 38-40.
19 See id.; Paul R. Gugliuzza, IP Injury and the Institutions of Patent Law, 98 IOWA L. REV. 747,
748-749 (2013).
20 Dolin, supra note 5, at 897 (describing that at no point “was any definition of what constitutes
a “low quality” versus a “high quality” patent, and how to tell the two apart, offered.”); see also Dan
Prud’homme, Dulling The Cutting-Edge: How Patent-Related Policies And Practices Hamper
Innovation In China 22-24 (2012), https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/47617/ (describing the ambiguity
of the term “bad patent”).
21 Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Procedure Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 4601-08,
113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-567 to -572 (1999) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-18 (2006)).
22 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2013).
23 Id. § 311(a).
24 Id. § 311(c)(1).
25 Id. § 311(b).
26 37 C.F.R. § 42.102(a)(2).
27 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
28 Id. § 316(a)(11) (stating that if a “good cause” can be shown, then the deadline for completion
of the IPR can be extended another 6 months). Even with this extension one can see how much quicker
these proceedings are in comparison to a typical federal court trial. Id.
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“on the same ground that the petitioner raised” during the IPR.29 This may seem like
this provision prevents “double-dipping,” but only novelty and obviousness challenges
may be raised in IPR proceedings. This allows for challengers to bring challenges
based on other grounds and include other claims, like validity. 30
While later proceedings may in fact only bring challenges based upon issues not
discussed in any previous IPRs, tension between PTAB and the federal courts still
exists. The Patent Office has a long history of using the BRI standard to interpret
claims.31 The Patent Office applies the BRI standard to “reduce the possibility that,
after the patent is granted, the claims may be interpreted as giving broader coverage
than is justified.”32 This standard is sensible for pre-issuance examination of patent
applications, but controversy arose when the Patent Office began to use this standard
in its IPR proceedings.33
The controversy exists due to differing standards of claim interpretation between
the Patent Office and the federal courts.34 While the Patent Office has long utilized
the BRI standard, federal courts have relied on the plain and obvious meaning
standard to interpret patent claims.35 “Plain and obvious” is the meaning that a person
of ordinary skill in the art, at the time of the invention, would place upon the word.36
This forces the district courts to select the “one ‘correct’ interpretation” of the claims”37
while the Patent Office is able to maintain a flexible analysis consistent with the

29 35 U.S.C. § 315(e); see Dolin, supra note 5, at 920 (explaining that IPR is governed by the
same estoppel provisions as PGR, which limit “the petitioner from filing additional judicial or
administrative challenges to the claims which were subject to [a previous] IPR”).
30 Dolin, supra note 5, at 920 (“given that only novelty and obviousness challenges can be raised
in IPR proceedings, the scope of the [IPR] estoppel is much narrower in practice”).
31 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 778 F.3d at 1280 (laying out list of instances in which the PTO
gives claims of its broadest reasonable construction) (citing In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571-72
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (PTO used BRI for reexamination proceedings)).
32 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 778 F.3d at 1280 (quoting In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05, 56
C.C.P.A. 1381 (CCPA 1969)).
33 See id. at 778-779 (court ruling that Patent Office was within its power to adopt the broadest
reasonable interpretation standard for its inter partes review proceedings).
34 See id. at 778 (upholding the use of the Patent Office’s use of broadest reasonable
interpretation standard even though the Federal Courts use the plain and obvious meaning standard).
35 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); see Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d
1295, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
36 See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313 (ruling that there has been a long and clear history of using the
term “plain and ordinary” in the context of what a person having ordinary skill in the art would view
it as); see also Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (stating that a court should construe a patent claim in accordance with the meaning a person
or ordinary skill in the art would have at “the time of the invention”); Home Diagnostics, Inc. V.
LifeScan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding that the term “customary meaning” refers
to the customary meaning to a person in the art field); Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls v. Mega
Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding that claim terms should be examined “through
the viewing glass of a person skilled in the art”).
37 David L. McCombs, Debra J. McComas, Andrew S. Ehmke, Stephanie N. Sivinski, Federal
Circuit Appeals From The PTAB: A New Game Or Just The Same Old Practice? , 95 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 240, 246 (proposing that the explanation for “Federal Circuit’s greater
affirmance of the Board on claim construction is the wider standard of interpretation the [IPR] Board
applies in the first instance).
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claims.38 The Federal Circuit has ruled that claims cannot be interpreted only in the
context of a particular claim, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire
patent, including the specification. 39 Because of these differences it is clear that the
Patent Office uses a broader standard.40
This difference came to light in In re Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC, a case before the
Federal Circuit.41 Cuozzo Speed Technologies (“Cuozzo”) owned U.S. patent number
6,788,074 entitled “Speed Limit Indicator and Method for Displaying Speed and
Relevant Speed Limit”.42 Garmin International and Garmin USA, Inc. (“Garmin”)
petitioned to the Patent Office for an IPR challenging several claims on the grounds of
obviousness.43
The Patent Office granted Garmin’s petition and instituted an IPR where it used
the BRI standard to strike down the claims. 44 Cuozzo appealed the decision on the
grounds that the PTAB used an incorrect standard to interpret its claims.45
At the Federal Circuit, Cuozzo claimed that the Patent Office should not use BRI
because it does not reflect the court’s post-grant interpretation standard.46 It argued
that due to the quasi-judicial nature of IPRs, claims should be construed using the
federal court’s plain and obvious meaning standard. 47
32 U.S.C. § 282.
See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313-1314 (claims must be viewed in light of the patent as a whole);
see also Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Mdzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (ruling that
“[i]t is the person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention through whose eyes the claims are
construed. Such a person is deemed to read the words used in the patent documents with an
understanding of their meaning in the field and to have knowledge of any special meaning and usage
in the field . . . The inventor’s lexicography must be understood . . . . ”); Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices
Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (ruling that claims cannot be given their ordinary terms
in a “vacuum.” The context of the written description and prosecution history must be considered);
Innova/Pure Water, Inc., 381 F.3d at 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (ruling that the meaning of claim terms to
persons skilled in the art is not always apparent, so courts may look to other sources which include
“the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the prosecution history, and
extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the
state of the art”).
40 L.B. Plastics, Inc. v. Amerimax Home Prods., Inc., 499 F.3d 1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314-19); see Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 71, 95 (2013).
41 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 778 F.3d at 1271 (this case ended up in the Federal Circuit because
it was appealed from the USPTO’s Patent Trial and Appeal board).
42 Id. at 1274.
43 Id. at 1283 (The IPR in its subsequent decision explained “an appropriate construction of the
term ‘integrally attached’ in independent claim 10 is central to the patentability analysis”).
44 Id. at 1283 (The Patent Trial and Appeal Board applied a broadest reasonable interpretation
to the term ‘integrally attached’ and construed the claim to mean discrete parts physically joined
together as a unit without each part losing its own separate identity).
45 Id. at 1282.
46 Id. at 1276.
47 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 778 F.3d 1289 (arguing that the IPR is not simply a reexamination
of a patent because of the heavy legislative emphasis place on the new procedures)
(citing H.R. Rep. no. 112-98, pt. 1, at 46 (2011) (explaining “[u]nlike reexamination proceedings,
which provide only a limited basis on which to consider whether a patent should have issued, the postgrant review proceeding permits a challenge on any ground related to invalidity under section 282.
The intent of the post-grant review process is to enable early challenges to patents . . . The Committee
believes that this new, early-stage process for challenging patent validity . . . will make the patent
system more efficient and improve the quality of patents and the patent system”)).
38
39
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The majority opinion, however, upheld the Patent Office’s use of BRI while
interpreting patent claims.48 The majority cited to the Patent Office’s long history of
using the BRI standard and reasoned that because the “AIA showed no indication to
change the claim construction standard [that] the PTO has applied for more than 100
years” there is no reason to assume a change would take place. 49
The dissent argued that upholding the Patent Office’s use of BRI creates a second
standard that conflicts with the original purpose of implementing IPR.50 The BRI is
treating an issued patent in the “same way as pending claims in the patent application
stage.”51 The BRI standard prevents the review of patent validity in IPR to reflect that
of the district courts, “where validity is determined based on the correct claim
construction, not an artificially ‘broadest’ construction.”52 In the Dissent, Judge
Newman believes that upholding BRI in IPR proceedings tarnishes the post-grant
judiciary review process set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp.53
This decision has caused widespread effects throughout the patent field like
forcing practitioners to alter litigation strategies,54 lowering confidence in patent
rights among patent holders, and rising of the so-called “PTAB Trolls”.55
48 See id. at 1282 (ruling that the Patent Office had the power under the AIA to set up and
enforce its own claim construction rule in the new inter partes review proceedings. This ruling created
a dual standard for interpreting claims between the federal courts and the PTAB).
49 See id. at 1280) (stating that Congress is presumed “to legislate against the background law
where Congress in enacting legislation is aware of the prevailing rule held at the Patent Office”).
50 See id. at 1287-1293 (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that although the PTAB is authorized
to apply trial and evidentiary procedures, it should not be able to differ in the law that is applied in
courts. Utilizing the broadest reasonable interpretation standard creates a discrepancy between an
artificial standard and a correct decision based on the standards from Phillips.) see Phillips, 415 F.3d
1303.
51 See id. at 1290 (dissent argues that IPR is limited to patent validity because validity is the
central issue in patent litigation. To serve as an appropriate “substitute for district court validity
determination, the legislation was designed to achieve the same correct decision as would be obtained
in a district court on the same evidence and law”).
52 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs. at 1291 (arguing that while “broadest reasonable interpretation” is
an expedient in examination and reexamination, applicants do not get the opportunity to amend their
claims in IPR. Therefore, using the artificially inflated standard is contradictory to the original
purpose of the BRI standard).
53 See id. at 1287-1293 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (en banc)
(demonstrating the significance in viewing claims as precisely as to what is patented)); see also Merrill
v. Yeommans, 94 U.S. 568, 570, 24 L.Ed. 235, 1877 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 279 (1876) (ruling that it is only
just that a patent is construed in a manner that “define precisely what the invention is”); Aro Mfg.
Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 339, 5 L. Ed. 2d 592, 81 S. Ct. 599, 1961 Dec.
Comm’r Pat. 635 (1961) (Patent Claims measure the patent rights granted); White v. Dunbar, 119
U.S. 47, 52, 30 L.Ed. 303 7 s. Ct. 72, 1886 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 494 (1886).
54 Walter M. Egbert, III and Scott E. Kamholz, Good, Fast Certainty: The Case for Patent Office
Litigation, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202737479153/GoodFast-Certainty-The-Case-for-Patent-Office-Litigation (last visited Sept. 10, 2016).
55 Joseph
Allen,
It’s
Time
to
“Whack”
IPR
Trolls,
IPWATCHDOG,
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/06/22/its-time-to-whack-ipr-trolls/id=58902/ (last visited Sept. 8,
2016) (discussing the rise of the PTAB troll and the current legislation that is trying to fix the
problem); see also Patience Haggin, Trolls Taste Own Medicine, THE RECORDER (successful nonproducing entities are being targeted with demand letters that ask for a percentage of a settlement or
the sender will initiate IPR proceedings.); Scott A. Mckeown, The Rise of the PTAB Troll, PATENTS
POST-GRANT (author lays out the business strategy of the PTAB Troll. Step 1: Identify a high value
damage award with strong prior art. Step 2: Institute an IPR proceeding with the same prior art and
approach the patent holder for a quick settlement. Step 3: Repeat with the next case).
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With the above mentioned consequences stemming from IPR’s use of the BRI
standard, courts should consider whether Congress had intended that the PTAB use
BRI.
III. ANALYSIS
This section will discuss the problems associated with the Supreme Court’s
decision to affirm the Federal Circuit’s decision that upheld the BRI standard. The
Supreme Court has now ruled on this issue and held that the decision to institute an
IPR proceeding is non-appealable and that the Patent Office’s decision to use BRI as
its claim construction standard was a reasonable exercise of the Patent Office’s
rulemaking authority granted to it by Congress. 56 While this ruling may seem like the
end of the discussion, Justice Breyer referred to the policy arguments made by the
petitioners and ruled that the Patent Office is “legally free to accept or reject such
policy arguments on the basis of its own reasoned analysis.”57 Justice Breyer pointed
out that the Court’s ruling on BRI merely reflected that the Patent Office’s use of BRI
was “reasonable in light of the rationales described . . . we do not decide whether there
is a better alternative as a policy matter.”58 This comment will focus on the application
of BRI and the Federal Circuit provided a much more in-depth discussion of the
appropriateness of the BRI standard. Therefore, this comment will examine the logic
of the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit’s decision created a proceeding that is
potentially just as costly as litigation, not efficient or expeditious, and creates
uncertainty in current patent holder’s rights.59
One of the arguments the majority made in In re Cuozzo was that Congress
“conveyed rulemaking authority to the PTO to prescribe regulations.”60 The majority
based this argument in the phrasing of the U.S.C. § 316(a)(2) saying that the Patent
and Trademark Office (“PTO”) was given authority in “establishing and governing
inter partes review.”61 Based on this authority, the PTO adopted the BRI standard for
IPR proceedings.62
The dissenting judges responded to this argument by stating that the PTO was
only given the authority to enact regulation and that the very same statute states that
the PTO is not granted the power to erect “substantive statutory patentability
standards.”63 Yet, the majority insisted that the regulatory authority would give the
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 195 L.Ed.2d 423, 432 (2016).
See id. at 444.
58 See id.
59 Charles E. Miller and Daniel P. Archibald, Beware The Suppression Of District-Court
Jurisdiction Of Administrative Decisions In Patent-Validity Challenges Under The America Invents
Act: A Critical Analysis Of A Legislative Black Swan In An Age Of Preconceived Notions And SpecialInterest Lobbying, 95 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 124, 128 (2013).
60 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 778 F.3d at 1279 (holding that due to the America Invents act being
silent on the issue of whether the broadest reasonable interpretation standard is appropriate for IPRs,
the PTO has the authority to determine which standard for claim construction should be used).
61 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4) (“The director shall prescribe regulations setting forth the standards for
showing of sufficient grounds to institute . . . review,” and “establishing and governing inter partes
review . . . and the relationship of such review to other proceedings”).
62 See id.
63 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 778 F.3d at 1273.
56
57
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PTO the ability to enact regulation setting forth standards by which claims would be
construed.64 This would necessarily affect the scope and validity of patents.
The dissent further argued that this is not a scenario in which the Court should
defer to the PTO’s action.65 In the dissent’s view, subsections (2) and (4) of § 316 are
consistent with Congress’s previous grants of authority to proscribe only procedural
regulations.66 Subsection (2) provides regulations for the PTO to follow when
determining if petitioners have met the burden to institute a review. 67 Subsection (4)
provides regulations that establish and govern inter partes review. 68 Congress felt so
strongly on instructing the PTO on this new proceeding that these regulations fully
provide for IPR’s existence and control how the proceeding will be conducted. 69
The majority stated that subsections (2) and (4) cover the claim construction
standard because it “affects both the PTO’s determination of whether to institute IPR
proceedings and the proceedings after the institution.”70 Because the majority believed
Congress authorized the PTO to prescribe these regulations, it uses the Chevron
framework to analyze the validity of the regulation.71 Chevron is a two-step inquiry
that first asks whether Congress directly spoke to the question at issue. 72 If it is found
that the congressional intent is unclear, the next question is “whether the agency’s
interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statutory language.”73
The majority began the analysis by finding that Congress’s silence on claim
construction means that step one of Chevron is satisfied.74 Moving on to the second
step of the analysis, the majority asserted that the PTO’s use of BRI is consistent with
the PTO’s long-standing practice of interpreting claims that way. 75 In light of this
See id.
See id. at 1288 (Newman, J., dissenting) citing Cooper Techs. Co. V. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330,
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 2 to mean that the PTO is granted the authority to
specify standards to institute a review).
66 See id.
67 See id. at 1289 (Newman, J., dissenting); 35 U.S.C. § 316(2).
68 See id. at 1289 ((citing Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1132 (2015) (finding that
the scope of subsections (2) and (4) can be determined to be procedural by looking at the other 11
sections which are clearly procedural)).
69 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 778 F.3d at 1289.
70 See id. at 1282.
71 See id. at 1282 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 121 S. Ct. 2164, 150
L. Ed. 2d 292 (2011); see Wilder v. Merit Ss. Prot. Bd., 675 F. 3d 1319, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
72 Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed.
2d 694 (1984) (laying out the foundation for the two-step Chevron rule, first step is to determine
congressional intent, if unknown, determine whether agency’s interpretation is permissible within
the meaning of the statute); see Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
73 Cooper, 536 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Hawkins v. United States, 469 F.3d 993, 1000 (Fed. Cir.
2006)).
74 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 778 F.3d at 1287-1293.
75 See id. at 1279 (citing Podelesak v. McInnerney, 1906 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 265, 268
(demonstrating a very early use of broadest reasonable interpretation and stating that “no better
method of construing claims is perceived than to give them in each case the broadest interpretation
which they will support without straining the language in which they are couched”); see also Miel v.
Young, 29 app. D.C 481, 484, 1907 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 561 (D.C. Circ. 1907) (demonstrating another
case from over 100 years ago that applied the broadest reasonable interpretation standard); In re
Rambus, In., 753 F.3d 1253, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (ruling that during reexamination claims are given
their broadest reasonable interpretation that is consistent with the specification.); In re Am. Acad. Of
Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that broadest reasonable interpretations
64
65
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history, the court found that the PTO’s implementation of BRI standard is appropriate
in IPRs.76
The dissent, however, asserted that the majority failed to understand that § 316
does not provide such substantial authority to the Patent Office. 77 The Patent Office
was never given authority to prescribe such regulations on any issue that “affects”
decisions to institute IPR’s or the results of later proceedings.78 As the dissent points
out, the PTO’s “authority to prescribe a regulation must first be rooted in the statute.”79
Another argument against upholding BRI is based on the PTO’s authority that
even if the regulation using BRI is classified as procedural, deference to the Patent
Office’s decision is inappropriate when the regulation “is contrary to the intent of
congress as divined from the statute and its legislative history.”80 The dissent argued
that the use of BRI in IPR creates a departure from the purpose of the AIA and should
not be given any deference.81 In fact, throughout the legislative history there is
mention that the creation of IPR’s was meant to give a reliable and efficient
substitution of district court litigation.82 Administrative regulations must implement
the purpose of the statute they serve, not contradict it. 83 With pending legislation 84
serves the public interest because it reduces the possibility that claims will be given broader scope
than is justified); In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (ruling that it is improper for the
Patent Office to interpret claims in the same manner as district court judges do in post-issuance
proceedings); In re Kebrich, 201 F.2d 951, 954, 40 C.C.P.A. 780, 1953 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 94 (CCPA
1953) (stating that it is well established that tribunals at the PTO and reviewing courts “in the initial
consideration of patentability will give claims the broadest interpretation which, with in reason may
be applied”).
76 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 778 F.3d at 1280 (stating that because the court has approved of
BRI in “a variety of proceedings” including in every unexpired patent proceeding, BRI is acceptable).
77 See id. at 1281 (stating that § 316 provides the PTO only the authority to adopt the BRI
standard in a regulation); 35 U.S.C. § 316.
78 See id. at 1281 (stating that § 316 does not grant the PTO “the power to erect substantive
statutory patentability standards”).
79 See id. at 1287-1293 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000)).
80 See id. at 1291 (Newman, J., dissenting) (quoting Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n. 20,
99 S. Ct. 790, 58 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1979)); see also Muwwakkil v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 18 F.3d 921, 925
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (ruling that if an agency’s interpretation of a statute was granted to administer is
contrary to the intent of Congress, the courts owe it no deference).
81 See id. at 1291 (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that “in promulgating 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b),
the PTO departed from the purpose of the America Invents Act to create a reliable substitute for
district court litigation”).
82 See H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 46 (2011) (describing IPR as adjudicative the report explains
that “Unlike reexamination proceedings, which provide only a limited basis on which to consider
whether a patent should have issued, the post-grant review proceeding permits a challenge on any
ground related to invalidity . . . The intent of post grant review process is to enable early challenges
to patents . . . challenging patent validity . . . will make the patent system more efficient and improve
the quality of patents and the patent system”); see also 157 Con. Rec. S1111 (Mar. 2, 2011) (Sen. Leahy
stating that the purpose of the establishment of the inter partes review proceeding is to “decrease the
likelihood of expensive litigation because it creates a less costly, in-house administrative alternative
to review patent validity claims”).
83 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-214, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 47 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1976)
(holding that rulemaking power granted to administrative agencies implementing federal statutes is
not the power to make law. The power lies in the administrative agency’s ability to adopt regulations
that carry into effect Congress’s statutory intent).
84 H.R. Rep. No. 113-279, at 13-14 (2013) (The House has passed a resolution amending section
316(a) to state that when the PTO is interpreting claims in inter partes review proceedings, “each
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that indicates that IPR should apply the exact opposite outcome reached by the
majority, it is the obligation of the courts to interpret the statute in accordance with
its explicit legislative purpose.85
The Supreme Court has weighed in on judicial branch and administrative
agencies conflict by stating that, “although an agency’s interpretation of a
statute . . . is entitled to some deference, this deference is constrained by our obligation
to honor the clear meaning of a statute, as revealed by its language, purpose and
history.”86
The next major attack against the use of BRI in IPRs is that the “give-and-take”
of claim amendments with the Patent Office is not readily available to patentees in an
IPR proceeding. Claim amendments have been described as merely an illusory
feature.87 The issue is that claims require permission from the PTAB to be amended. 88
As of June 30th, 2015 only 27 claims of the total 442 motions to amend were granted. 89
This means that PTAB has only granted permission to about 6% of these motions. 90
This stark contrast with the “give-and-take” procedure of examination and
reexamination defeats the purpose of BRI anyway.91
The BRI standard was formulated as a protocol to address the patentability of
applications argued to the PTO. 92 It is true that the BRI has a long history of use in
claim of a patent shall be construed as such claim would be in a civil action to invalidate a
patent . . . including constructing each claim of the patent in accordance with the ordinary and
customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and prosecution
history pertaining to the patent . . . .).
85 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs.,778 F.3d at 1291 (Newman, J., dissenting).
86 See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 99 S. Ct. 2361, 60 L. Ed. 2d 980,
(1979).
87 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 778 F.3d at 1291 (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that the “ability
to amend claims in Inter Partes Review proceedings as administered by the PTO, is almost entirely
illusory).
88 37 C.F.R. § 42.221(a) (The Patent and Trademark Office regulations provide that a patent
owner can file a singular motion to amend a patent but only after the patentee confers with the board
and is granted the motion.).
89 Just the Stats: Number of Claims Amended/Denied Amendments, POST-GRANT HQ,
http://www.postgranthq.com/statistics/ipr-number-of-claims-amendeddenied-amendment/
(last
visited Sept. 10, 2016); see also Andrew Williams, PTAB Update-the Board Grants Its Second Motion
to Amend (at least in part), PATENT DOCS (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.patentdocs.org/2015/01/ptabupdate-the-board-grants-its-second-motion-to-amend-at-least-in-part.html; see Jennifer E. Hoekel,
PTAB Grants First Opposed Motion to Amend Claims-Patent Trial and Appeal Board, THE NATIONAL
LAW REVIEW (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/ptab-grants-first-opposed-motionto-amend-claims-patent-trial-and-appeal-board; Brad M. Scheller and Anthony J. Zappin, PTAB
Grants Fourth Motion To Amend In an IPR Proceeding, GLOBAL IP MATTERS (June 16, 2015),
http://www.globalipmatters.com/2015/06/16/ptab-grants-fourth-motion-to-amend-in-an-iprproceeding (author speculates that in light of the recent grants to amend in the PTAB there might be
indications that the very strict standard that was once used to deny so many motions to amend claims,
may be loosening its grip. ); Scott A. Meckowen, PTAB Grants First Motion to Amend in IPR, PATENTS
POST GRANT, (May 22, 2015), http://www.patentspostgrant.com/ptab-grants-first-motion-to-amendin-ipr.
90 Scott A. Meckowen, PTAB Grants First Motion to Amend in IPR, PATENTS POST GRANT, (May
22, 2015), http://www.patentspostgrant.com/ptab-grants-first-motion-to-amend-in-ipr.
91 Dolin, supra note 5, at 929 (“it appears that at least so far [amendments are] purely
ephemeral”).
92 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs.,778 F.3d at 1289 (Newman, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Yamamoto,
740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also MPEP § 2258 (stating that during reexamination
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Patent Office proceedings, however, these proceedings utilized BRI for expediency and
ensured that allowed claims were not given a broader scope than justified. 93 The BRI
worked so well because claims were readily amendable in these settings.94 The Patent
Office used BRI to provide a framework in which claims are clarified with an applicant
and, if necessary, amended to ensure proper scope. 95 The BRI standard was never
intended to operate as a method to determine the “correct” meaning and scope of
claims.96 It was used as a prophylactic to prevent patentees rights from over-reaching
into prior art or materials outside the specification disclosure.
The majority refutes this by referencing the same string of cases affirming the use
of BRI in Patent Office proceedings for the last 100 years. 97 Over the years, the court
has upheld cases that used BRI in examination proceedings, reexamination
proceedings, interferences, and tribunals at the PTO. 98 Every case reiterates the merit
BRI possesses to prevent overly broad claims and needless litigation in the court
systems. The majority found that there was no indication that the AIA was designed
to change the standard the PTO has used in the vast majority of its proceedings,
including all instances involving unexpired patents.99
However, the glaring difference between all the proceedings described by the
majority and nter partes review is the availability to amend claims. 100 Motions to
amend claims are readily available in every single case to which the majority in In re
Cuozzo cited; however, these motions are not so easily available to patentees in inter
partes review.101 As stated above, only 6% of motions to amend have been granted by
the PTAB.102 However, the majority asserted that IPR proceedings are not “materially
different” in respect to the litany of other PTO proceedings.103 Referencing 35 U.S.C.
§ 316(d)(1), the majority was satisfied that patentee might file one motion to amend a
claim that must be conferred with PTAB.104
The majority stated that even though this may be an additional burden placed
upon the patentee, the ability to amend still exists. 105 The majority added that the “fact
that a patent owner may be limited to a single amendment, may not broaden the

proceedings involving claims of an expired patent, claim construction should follow the principles set
forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., meaning that words of a claim will be given their ordinary and
customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art. The Phillips principles
apply because expired claims are not subject to amendment).
93 In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d at 1571 (ruling that BRI protects the public interest).
94 In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that reexamination is conducted
according to procedures established in initial examination of applications according to § 132 and
§ 133).
95 MPEP § 2258.
96 In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d at 1571.
97 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 778 F.3d at 1282.
98 See id.
99 See id. at 1283.
100 37 C.F.R. § 42.221(a).
101 See id.
102 See id.
103 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 778 F.3d at 1280.
104 See id. at 1282.
105 See id.
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claims, and must address the ground of unpatentability is not a material difference.”106
It also stated that even though IPR may be adjudicatory in nature, interference
proceedings were also adjudicatory and the patent office still applied the BRI
standard.107
One confusing aspect of the majority’s opinion is that it admits that the single
exception to the BRI standard in Patent Office proceedings is due solely to the patentee
being unable to amend its claims.108 Furthermore, the majority cited cases that stress
the importance of claim amendments when using BRI during examination. 109
However, as the dissent argued, the majority decided to ignore the concepts that the
cases were trying to teach and ruled based on the “technically possible” ability to
amend claims.110
The next issue the dissent addressed was that IPR is limited solely to patent
validity because “validity is a central issue in patent litigation and often is dispositive
of the entire litigation.”111 It relied on the conclusion that if IPR were to be an effective
substitute for validity determinations procured in the district courts, then the same
correct decision must be reached in both the district courts and inter partes review.112
If both proceedings were to obtain the same decision, then they must apply the same
standards to each procedure; the same methods to determine validity as a matter of
fact and law must correspond with each other.113 The dissent argued that if the PTAB
were able to apply differing rules of law and evidence from the district court, then it
would not sufficiently “serve its purpose as a district court surrogate.”114
The dissent pointed out that the BRI of claims would differ from the ultimately
correct decision based on the Phillips standard used in the federal courts. 115 The use
of BRI creates claim definitions that may be no more than legal fiction. It is clear from
House Reports that IPR was intended to be adjudicatory.116 Therefore, the dissenting
judges argued that the only way to fulfill the legislative plan set forth by Congress, is
to apply the correct construction of plain and obvious meaning to a person of ordinary
skill in the art.117
Turning to the Supreme Court decision, Justice Breyer emphasizes that the
question of the best claim construction standard is specifically left to the particular
expertise of the patent office.118 While the BRI standard in PTAB is still current law,

106 See id. at 1281 (stating that even though a patentee is limited to only one motion to amend,
and that the opportunity to amend is cabined in the inter partes review setting, there are no material
differences between this proceeding and others).
107 Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d 862, 867-868 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
108 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs.,778 F.3d at 1289.
109 See id. at 1282.
110 See id. at 1289 (Newman, J., dissenting).
111 See id.
112 See id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
113 See id.
114 See id. at 1281 (stating that IPR cannot function as Congress had intended it to be, as an
appropriate surrogate for district courts if it doesn’t apply the same law and facts to reach a correct
conclusion using the principles laid out in the Phillips plain and ordinary meaning standard).
115 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs.,778 F.3d at 1288.
116 H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1 at 46.
117 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., at 1288.
118 See id.
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the Supreme Court left a path of correction for the most knowledgeable in the field.119
In other words, the Patent Office should listen to feedback from its colleagues and
correct the standard.
The PTO should hear the feedback loud and clear, as it is no secret that many
knowledgeable organizations filed amicus briefs in support of Petitioner. 120 The
common thread among these briefs is that that they focused on the BRI standard,
which was incorrectly applied.121
For example, The Biotechnology Industry
Organization (“BIO”) argues that the PTAB’s use of BRI is a “fundamentally incorrect
standard of claim construction.”122 This emphasized that the PTAB has construed
claims in broader terms than what the patentee alleges—essentially granting
patentees rights then stripping them away later.123
The New York Intellectual Property Law Association (“NYIPLA”) argued that the
purpose of BRI is not to determine the “actual meaning” of the claim, but rather
determine the outer bounds of the claim and prevent post-grant claims from being
interpreted broader than justified.124 The NYIPLA further argued that negligible
opportunities to amend, created uncertainty in patent holder’s rights and has rippled
throughout the industry.125
The Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”)
argues that the continued use of BRI will ““introduce considerable uncertainty in the
construction of patent claims, increase the risk of conflicting invalidity decisions, and
undercut a central reform that Congress enacted to strengthen the U.S. patent
system.”126 The PhRMA further argues that PTAB’s use of BRI threatens the
predictability and strength of protection that the patent system provides to innovators
and the public.127
Turning our attention back to the Supreme Court, it is clear that the Court ruled
that the PTAB has the authority to establish a claim standard in IPR, and that BRI is
a reasonable standard.128 It is now time for the Patent Office to focus on what is the
best standard. The arguments brought forth in the amici reflect many of the same
points the dissent highlighted back in the Federal Circuit.129
See id.
Brief for New York Intellectual Property Association as Amicus Curiae, Cuozzo Speed Techs.,
LLC v. Lee, 195 L.Ed.2d 423 (2016); Brief for Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufacturers of
America as Amicus Curiae, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 195 L.Ed.2d 423 (2016); Brief for
American Intellectual Property Law Association as Amicus Curiae, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,
195 L.Ed.2d 423 (2016); Brief for Mitchel Hamline School of Law Intellectual Property Institute as
Amicus Curiae, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 195 L.Ed.2d 423 (2016); Brief for Biotechnology
Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 195 L.Ed.2d 423 (2016).
121 Id.
122 Brief for Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v.
Lee, 195 L.Ed.2d 423 (2016) (arguing that the Patent Office may grant a different ruling than district
courts and that a chance to amend is simply illusory and most often denied).
123 Id.
124 Brief for American Intellectual Property Law Association as Amicus Curiae, Cuozzo Speed
Techs., LLC v. Lee, 195 L.Ed.2d 423 (2016) (citing In re Reuter, 670 F.2d 1015, 1015 (CCPA 1981)).
125 Id.
126 Brief for Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufacturers of America as Amicus Curiae,
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 195 L.Ed.2d 423 (2016).
127 Id.
128 See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 195 L.Ed.2d 423, 443 (2016).
129 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs.,778 F.3d at 1291 (Newman, J., dissenting).
119
120
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Many of the problems with applying the BRI standard’ are still present today.
For example, the PTO has issued a New Rule on May 2nd 2016, in which it will be
using the Phillips standard for patents that will likely expire during the proceeding.130
Thus, these new rules make the Phillips standard applicable to patents with no ability
to amend and the BRI standard applicable to patents that have the ability to amend.131
The new Rule, however, did not make any changes to the amendment process.132 The
PTO merely noted that it would “further consider ways to promote uniformity in the 4
requirements for a motion to amend, such as by designating opinions precedential,
issuing a standing order setting forth what requirements govern a proceeding for
motions to amend, or other means.”133
While this new rule does take a step in the right direction by allowing Phillips in
select cases, it fails to remedy the problem. Many of the cases in front of the PTAB
will still be subject to the BRI standard. In addition, the Patent Office failed to offer
any solution to the high rate of denied amendments during IPR. The Patent Office
continues to justify its discrepancy with the federal courts by claiming that this is how
they have always done it. However, continuing to apply an incorrect standard just
because “this is always how it has been done”, is hardly a justification for continuing
to be incorrect moving forward.134
The problems that existed when the case entered the Federal Circuit have yet to
be corrected. But, the Supreme Court has left open an avenue and presented the task
of fixing this problem to the Patent Office. Hopefully, the Patent Office will follow the
advice of numerous organizations, professors, and practitioners who have voiced their
opinion that Phillips is the correct standard to use in IPR proceedings.

IV. PROPOSAL
After analyzing the issues arising from the Federal Circuit’s ruling in In re
Cuozzo, upholding the BRI standard in IPR,135 and the Supreme Court’s ruling
upholding this decision, I propose that the plain and obvious meaning standard be used
in IPR proceedings. This solution will be the most appropriate course of action due to

130 Patent
and Trademark Office, 81 FR 18750-18766 (May 2, 2016) available at
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2016/04/01/2016-07381/amendments-to-the-rules-ofpractice-for-trials-before-the-patent-trial-and-appeal-board.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Quinn Gene, Supreme Court Accepts Cuozzo Speed Technologies IPR Appeal, IPWATCHDOG,
(January 15, 2016) http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/01/15/supreme-court-accepts-cuozzo-speedtechnologies-ipr-appeal/id=65076/ (Author criticizes the shortcomings of the PTO’s argument to
maintain BRI stating “[s]imply stated, use of BRI and providing no presumption strips the already
issued patent of key protections the patent, a property right, would enjoy in federal district court.
Why? Disparate treatment in what was supposed to be a district court alternative is impossible to
justify in any fair way”).
135 The Supreme Court recently upheld the Federal Circuit’s ruling, however, the same proposed
solution is still applicable.
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the adjudicative nature of IPR,136 the insufficient ability to amend claims,137 and the
uncertainty thrusted upon the rights of patent holders.138
It is easy to see the problems that arise from the adjudicative elements of the IPR.
It is somewhat ironic that the same court put in place to discourage forum shopping in
patent litigation, has delivered a decision that makes forum shopping an inherent
strategic consideration for both infringers and rights holders. 139 The Federal Circuit
affords substantial deference to the PTAB’s interpretations unless they are plainly
erroneous.140 This includes the PTO’s prior art considerations and now the PTO’s claim
construction.141
This deference has forced practitioners to heavily analyze the strategies between
bringing a petition in IPR or bringing suit in district court.142 This highlights that a
practitioner may now forum shop between filing in a certain district court, bringing a
petition before the IPR, or even proceeding in parallel with both.
These strategy considerations will hinge on the fact that if a favorable result can
be achieved in IPR, then great deference will be given to that decision on appeal.143
However, if an unexpected or unfavorable decision is delivered in an IPR proceeding,
it will be much more difficult on appeal to get a reversal.144
These decisions become even more complicated for the practitioner when he or she
must consider preclusive effects of differing rulings in the IPR and the Federal
Circuit.145 While it is well established that invalidity in the Federal Circuit will create
a preclusive effect in later proceedings in both IPR and federal court, claim
construction and findings of no invalidity may not inherit the same preclusive effect in
IPR.146 The PTAB considers parties’ claim construction positions in the district court
In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 778 F.3d at 1281.
37 C.F.R. § 42.221.
138 See Irina D. Manta, Privatizing Trademarks, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 381, 383 (2009) (This is an
analogous situation of the current uncertainty in Patents to the uncertainty felt in trademark context.
“This period is one of uncertainty for a trademark applicant. He can choose to launch his product or
service with an unregistered mark, but doing so could mean losing any investments in advertising
and marketing associated with a potential registration refusal and a subsequent change in marks”).
139 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 merged the U.S. Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals and the U.S. Court of Claims to form the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit).
140 David L. McCombs, Debra J. McComas, Andrew S. Ehmkke, & Stephanie N. Sivinski, Federal
Circuit Appeals From The PTAB: A New Game Or Just The Same Old Practice?, 95 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 240, 247 (citing Belkin Int’l, Inc. v. Kappos, 696 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
141 Id.
142 David L. McCombs, Debra J. McComas, Andrew S. Ehmkke, & Stephanie N. Sivinski, supra
note 140 (Author makes note of the strategy considerations of the certain limitations on a party’s
ability to bring parallel proceedings in the Patent office and the District Court); see 35. U.S.C. § 315.
143 David L. McCombs, Debra J. McComas, Andrew S. Ehmkke, & Stephanie N. Sivinski, supra
note 140 (noting the pros and cons that currently exist for parties considering filing a petition for an
IPR).
144 David L. McCombs, Debra J. McComas, Andrew S. Ehmkke, & Stephanie N. Sivinski, supra
at note 140, at 4.
145 MPEP § 2286(IV) (discussing effect of final court decision of invalidity on ex parte
reexamination proceeding).
146 Translogic Tech., Inc. v. Hitachi, Ltd., 250 Fed. App’x. 988 994 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (demonstrating
Federal Circuit having the ability to hear cases from the Patent Office and having a preclusive effect
on later proceedings such as district court suits); see also David L. McCombs, Debra J. McComas,
Andrew S. Ehmkke, & Stephanie N. Sivinski, Federal Circuit Appeals From The Ptab: A New Game
136
137
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“unreliable” and thus, irrelevant to the PTAB’s own claim construction during IPR.147
This means that prior arguments made in the district courts tailored toward the plain
and obvious meaning, must be reformed to the much broader standard of BRI at the
PTAB. In several decisions, the Federal Circuit has upheld that judgments of no
invalidity will not preclude subsequent finding of invalidity in IPR. 148 However, any
rulings of infringement will still be binding to all parties. 149 This landscape creates the
possibility that an unsuccessful defendant may have binding judgment against him,
yet later have the very same claims ruled invalid. 150
These procedures have created a so-called “race to the Federal Circuit.”151
Essentially, whoever is able to receive a favorable final judgment from the Federal
Circuit may finally step out of the coliseum of litigation and rest easy behind the
protective shield of preclusion.
The BRI standard creates even further problems by adding a “stigma of
uncertainty regarding entitlement to the patent”152 Due to the deference given to the
PTAB and its determination to resist preclusive effects of claim construction
determinations from the district courts, patent holders will constantly be forced to
endure this patent purgatory until the Federal Circuit decides to open its gates to their
appeal. These actions from the Patent Office may also implicate constitutional issues.
Judge Newman’s dissent in In re Baxter Int’l proposed that permitting the PTO to
reexamine these patents and apply a different claim may be unconstitutional.153 A
government agency actively “ignoring” decisions from a federal court would violate the
principles of res judicata.154
A new pattern has risen in response to the PTAB “ignoring” validity decisions in
district courts: district courts have opted to stay litigation until the conclusion of any

Or Just The Same Old Practice?, 95 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 240, 248 (discussing how
preclusive effect may not apply to claim construction, “PTAB considers a parties’ claim construction
position in the district court “unreliable” and thus irrelevant to the PTAB’s construction during inter
partes review”).
147 Translogic Tech.,250 Fed. App’x. at 994.
148 In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665
F.3d 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
149 David L. McCombs, Debra J. McComas, Andrew S. Ehmkke, & Stephanie N. Sivinski, supra
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152 In re Baxter Int’l, 678 F.3d at 1360 (quoting Bruning v. Hirose, 161 F.3d 681, 685 (Fed. Cir.
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parallel IPR proceedings.155 This will only cause further delay in obtaining a final
judgment and will force another layer of litigation onto parties.
A short term solution to this particular problem would be the Patent Office
following the lead of district courts and precluding any claims or issues that had been
brought in the district court proceedings. This will give district court judges assurance
that their decisions on validity will not be quickly contradicted in IPR’s. To achieve a
long-term solution, however, the Patent Office must apply the plain and obvious
standard of claim construction. Without this final resolution, forum shopping will still
exist between rights holders who would prefer the narrower standard in the district
courts, and the alleged infringers who would want the broader standard in IPR.
Returning to another major factor complicating the PTAB’s use of BRI is the lack
of a patent holder’s ability to amend claims in the IPR process.156 With only 6% of
motions to amend being granted, it is hard to imagine this process being sufficiently
similar to prosecution.157 Much of the value from use of the BRI standard is removed
when claims cannot be amended.158 Unfortunately, the solution requires more than
just granting more motions to amend. If the PTAB raised their grant rates to a level
similar to prosecution, about 85%,159 the teeth congress intended to give the IPR will
be removed.160 Instead of instituting a binding adjudicative proceeding between two
parties, the patent holder would simply be involved in another round of prosecution.
The patent holder and the public would be consistently uncertain about the scope of
rights to which a patent holder is entitled to. If a patent is continually subjected to
such proceedings where it must progressively amend and narrow its claims, the
patent’s worth, and patents in general, will consistently depreciate over their grant
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periods.161 It is clear that the PTAB cannot merely grant more motions to amend and
attempt to cling to the BRI. If the PTAB intends to assert the power that was intended
for IPR, then they must use the plain and obvious meaning.
Finally, the PTAB has a duty to apply the plain and obvious meaning in claim
construction during IPR because the congressional intent is clear. 162 The congressional
intent in the AIA is clear, as well as, the congressional reaction from the
implementation of the BRI standard.163

V. CONCLUSION
It is clear from the proposed legislation that Congress intended for IPRs to
construe claims using the plain and obvious standard. While the legislation has not
passed, the PTAB is essentially covering its eyes and ears from the voice and messages
of Congress’ hints and nudges. While we wait for Congressional action, the PTO can
use its regulatory powers164 to simply change the standard to plain and obvious
meaning. The Patent Office has been granted an excellent opportunity to expedite
patent litigation and solidify the strength of patent rights. Hopefully, the correct
interpretation will ultimately prevail.
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